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COMMENTS
INSURANCE AND THE COMMUNITY
The community property system originated in the customary
law of the Middle Ages and was included in codifications of the
civil law.1 With the exception of marine insurance, insurance
law had its origins in the common law of contracts 2 and did not
develop extensively in this country until the early nineteenth
century.3 It seems probable that the community property pro-
visions of the Louisiana Civil Code were not drafted with insur-
ance in mind since at the time of the adoption of the Code Na-
poleon and the first Civil Code of Louisiana, a contract of life
insurance was a prohibited wagering contract in France.4
This Comment investigates the relationship between the two
systems of law, conflicts which have developed, and the harmony
that can be achieved. The most important question in most cases
is whether a policy of insurance or the proceeds payable there-
under should be characterized as property of the community
existing between the spouses or the separate property of one
spouse.
The discussion will follow the broad distinction between
property insurance, which is based on a contract to indemnify
or restore a loss of property, and personal insurance, which is
not a contract of indemnity. As health insurance cannot exact-
ly be classified under either of these categories, it will receive
separate treatment.
1. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAw INSTITUTE) no. 891 (1959). See generally 1 DE FUNIAK,
PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §§ 7-8 (1943); MCKAY, COMMUNITY
PROPERTY §§ 1-9, 15-32 (2d ed. 1925).
2. See Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 1040, 24 So.
16, 23 (1898) (concurring opinion by Miller, J.) ; VANCE, INSURANCE §§ 2-4 (3d
ed. 1951).
3. The first case to reach a Court of last resort in the United States was Lord
v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, 7 Am. Dec. 38 (1815). See VANCE, INSURANCE § 4 (3d
ed. 1951).
4. See Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 1040, 24 So. 16,




A. The Character of Life Insurance - Policy and Proceeds
A life insurance policy is property 5 in the nature of a non-
negotiable, incorporeal, personal right,6 even before the death'
of the cestui que vie.8  While it is true that a right to the pro-
ceeds is exigible only upon the death of the cestui que vie, a
property right in the policy itself exists prior to his death. This
latter right embraces the lifetime benefits such as the options
to borrow against the policy, to surrender it and receive its cash
surrender value, to receive dividends, or to pledge it to a third
person as security for a debt.) Thus, it is necessary to character-
ize both the policy itself and the proceeds which may be payable
upon the occurrence of the event insured against as either sep-
arate or community property.10 The distinction between these
characterizations should be borne in mind throughout this dis-
cussion, as it seems to be the key to the Louisiana jurispru-
dence."
. 5. The early case of Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874) contains
a contrary statement which, although not expressly overruled, has never been fol-
lowed. See, e.g., In re Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886). It seems elemental,
however, that reciprocal rights and obligations under a contract of insurance are
things susceptible of ownership. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 13 (3d ed. 1951).
6. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 460, 470, 475, 870 (1870) ; Messersmith v. Messer-
smith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1956).
7. See Succession of Kugler, 23 La. Ann. 455 (1871).
8. Four different persons may be referred to in a life insurance contract: the
insurer, the insured (who is the person contracting with the insurer), the cestui
que vie (whose life forms the subject of the policy, and for whose death the. pro-
ceeds may be claimed), and the beneficiary. In the case of an individual procur-
ing insurance on his own life, payable to some beneficiary, it is unnecessary to
distinguish between the insured and the cestui que vie, since they are one and the
same. But since a person may insure the life of any person in whom he has an
insurable interest, it is necessary to distinguish between the party contracting
with the insurer and the party whose life is the subject of the policy. See PAT-
TERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 156 (2d ed. 1957).
9. See, for example, the ordinary (whole) life insurance policy used by the
Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States in PATTERSON & YOUNG,
INSURANCE 726 (4th ed. 1961).
10. Although the cases do not advert to this distinction, it was suggested by
the early case of Succession of Hearing, 26 La. Ann. 326 (1874), where the policy
was clearly an asset of the community, but the court held the proceeds, when due,
fell into the separate estate of the beneficiary. See Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La.
1077, 115 So. 275 (1928); Succession of Desforges, 135 La. 49, 64 So. 978
(1914) ; Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 24 So. 16 (1898) ;
Pilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 322 (1881) ; Succession of Bofen-
schen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877) ; cf. Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin, 211 La.
1089, 31 So. 2d 220 (1947).
11. The distinction has been made more important by the almost universal
practice by insureds of reserving the right to change beneficiaries. Before this
practice came into common usage, the insured who did not reserve the right caused
the contingent right to the proceeds to be vested in the named beneficiary. Al-
though the insured had a right in the policy, consisting of the lifetime benefits
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Because of the number of persons who may have an interest
in a policy of life insurance, and in the proceeds of it when due,
12
many combinations of circumstances may arise. Proper analysis
demands that the character of the policy itself be first deter-
mined to ascertain ownership of the lifetime benefits. Moreover,.
the characterization of the policy sometimes has a bearing upon
the characterization of the proceeds or death benefits.
1. The Life Insurance Policy Itself
To facilitate discussion of the property characteristics of life
insurance policies a distinction will be made in accordance with
the well-settled general rule which holds that the time of issu-.
ance of the policy controls its classification as separate or com-
munity: a policy taken out before marriage is the separate prop-
erty of the insured; a policy taken out during marriage forms
part of the community's assets.13 If the community is dissolved
while both spouses are still living, the characterization of poli-
cies is of the utmost importance. On the other hand, if the com-
munity is dissolved by the death of the cestui que vie, the char-
acterization is normally of little interest, since the policy is
terminated by the same event which destroys the community. In
the latter case, the only time the classification of the policy will
be important is when the proceeds are payable to the insured's
estate.
14
a. Taken Out Before Marriage. - The theoretical justifica-
tion for the rule that a policy of life insurance taken out before
the marriage is the separate property of the spouse who pro-
(cash surrender, loan value, dividends) and death benefits (under the usual bene-
ficiary clause) when the beneficiary dies before the insured and no other bene-
ficiary is designated, it was of limited value without the right to direct the pro-
ceeds notwithstanding the wishes of the beneficiary. Thus, the characterization
of the policy itself was immaterial to the characterization of the proceeds payable
thereunder. Compare Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La. 1077, 115 So. 275 (1928), with
PFilcher v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 322 (1881). See VANCE, INSUB-
ANCE § 106 (3d ed. 1951).
12. See note 8 supra. The possible beneficiaries are the insured's spouse, the
insured's own estate, or a third person.
13. The rule was considered well settled by the court in In re Moseman, 38
La. Ann. 219 (1886), and has been followed consistently. The apparent bases of
the rule are the notions expressed by the Civil Code that property owned by a
spouse prior to marriage remains the separate property of that spouse, property
acquired by the reciprocal industry of the spouses during the marriage makes up
the community, and upon dissolution of the community a legal presumption exists
in favor of community ownership of property. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2402,
2405 (1870).
. 14. See notes 50 and 51 infra.
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cures it' seems to be by analogy to any other type of property
owned prior to the marriage which has not lost its separate iden-
tity during the marriage, and thus is separate property under
the provisions of article 2334.16 Often, the insured with a sep-
arate policy who has subsequently married will change benefi-
ciaries to favor his spouse. This act of the insured will not
change the character of the policy itself even though community
funds are used to maintain the policy in force. 1 7
Problems could arise, however, when community funds are
used to maintain in force a separate policy. The rule seems to
have been settled that under such circumstances, the community
is entitled to be reimbursed for the premiums paid.' Although
no case has adverted to it, justification for this rule may lie in
article 2408,19 which regulates the responsibility of a spouse to
the community for benefits to his separate estate received from
15. See In re Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), in part: "The property of married per-
sons is divided into separate and common property.
"Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or
acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by dona-
tion made to him or her particularly."
17. The basis for this rule is the insured's reservation of the right to change
beneficiaries. Thus, if the insured redesignates his own estate at a latter date,
or if the named beneficiary predeceases the insured and the policy provides that
the proceeds are to be paid to the insured's estate, then the proceeds will be paid
into his separate estate. This is a necessary implication of In re LeBourgeois,
144 La. 501, 80 So. 673 (1919). Cf. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So.
118 (1939) ; Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) ; In re
Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886).
18. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939) ; Succession of
LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917) ; Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605,
45 So. 520 (1908).
The topic of reimbursement has been the subject of two excellent articles:
Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitution from Commu-
nity Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1952) ; Huie, Separate Claims
to Reimbursement from Community Property in Louisiana, 27 TuL. L. Rev. 143
(1953).
The principle of reimbursement has been objected to on the ground that it
justifies the husband, who acts as the head and master of the community, in utiliz-
ing community property to further his own ends, in much the same way that a
fiduciary might use the funds in his control to increase the value of his own
holdings. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 79 (1943).
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870), in part: "When the separate property
of either the husband or the wife has been increased or improved during the mar-
riage, the other spouse, or his or her heirs, shall be entitled to the reward of one
half of the value of the increase or ameliorations, if it be proved that the increase
or ameliorations be the result of the common labor, expenses or industry."
See Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana-
Life Insurance Problems Under the Community Property System, 6 TuL. L. REV.
515, 540 (1932). It may be that article 2408 is not the basis for the principle
of reimbursement at all if it is merely an application of the general principle of
accession to the law of community property. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 504, 508,
520-532 (1870).
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the community. It may be argued that article 2408 is not en-
tirely applicable, for a strict application of it seems to suggest
that the proceeds paid under the policy are such an "increase"
of the separate property of the beneficiary as to make them
liable for the return to the other spouse of "one half of the
value of the increase. ' 20 This argument was laid to rest in the
early case of In re Moseman.2 1 The policy was found to be the
separate property of the husband but on a showing that the
policy was kept in force during the marriage with community
funds, the case was remanded to the trial court for the purpose
of determining the amount the community paid as premiums
during its existence. 22
b. Taken Out During Marriage. - Civil Code articles 2402,
2405 and 233423 provide that the community shall consist of the
estate which the parties acquire during the marriage even
though the acquisition may be in the name of only one of them,
and further that upon dissolution of the community all effects
which they possess are presumed to be common effects, in the
absence of proof of its acquisition as separate property and with
separate funds. These articles form the basis for the character-
20. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2408 (1870).
21. 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886). See Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So.
118 (1939) ; Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520 (1908) ; cf. Suc-
cession of Brownlee, 44 La. Ann. 917, 11 So. 590 (1892).
22. In re Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219, 223 (1886). Other community propertyjurisdictions do not use the reimbursement solution. California, for example, holds
that the community will be allowed to share in the proceeds in the proportion
that the amount of the community funds used in paying premiums bears to the
total amount of premiums paid. See McBride v. McBride, 11 Cal. App. 2d 521, 54
P.2d 480 (1936) ; Modern Woodmen of America v. Gray, 113 Cal. App. 729, 299
Pac. 754 (1931); 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNIrY PROPERTY § 79
(1943).
23. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870) : "This partnership or community con-
sists of the profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration
and enjoyment, either of right or in fact, of the produce of the reciprocal indus-
try and labor of both husband and wife, and of the estate which they may acquire
during the marriage, either by donations made jointly to them both, or by pur-
chase, or in any other similar way, even although the purchase be only in the
name of one of the two and not of both, because in that case the period of time
when the purchase is made is alone attended to, and not the person who made the
purchase ......
Id. art. 2405: "At the time of the dissolution of the marriage, all effects which
both husband and wife reciprocally possess, are presumed common effects or gains,
unless it be satisfactorily proved which of such effects they brought in marriage,
or which have been given them separately, or which they have respectively in-
herited."
Id. art. 2334, in part: "The property of married persons is divided into separ-
ate and common property.
"Separate property is that which either party brings into the marriage, or
acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by inheritance, or by dona-
tion made to him or her particularly."
[Vol. XXV
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ization of a life insurance policy taken out during the marriage
as community property.24 No case has been found in which
either spouse procured a policy during the marriage intending
that it be his separate property. However, there seems to be no
principle to prevent such an acquisition if the spouse can supply
sufficient proof that it was paid for with separate funds, and
that it was intended to be separate property. If the husband
has acquired the policy it might be argued that he ought to com-
ply with the strict requirements of the double declaration in the
contract, as is certainly the case in the acquisition of immov-
ables,25 that the funds were his separate property and that the
purchase was made for his individual account. It seems, how-
ever, that such an application would be an unjustifiable exten-
sion of a rule which may not be applicable at all to acquisitions
of movables.26 On the other hand, if the wife has taken out the
policy, she should certainly be allowed to prove by any means
that it was acquired with her separate funds, and is thus separ-
ate property.27
2. The Proceeds of a Life Insurance Policy
The rules governing the characterization of the proceeds of
a life insurance policy perhaps create the greatest conflicts with
the principles of community property. Although the cases do not
so generalize, the characterization of the proceeds seems to de-
pend upon the types of beneficiary named in the policy. The
types are three in number: a third person, the insured's spouse,
and the insured's estate.
It should be noted that since 191428 the proceeds of life in-
surance policies are exempt by statute from the claims of cred-
itors of either the insured or of the community.
a. Payable to a Third Person. - The husband has virtually
unlimited power to name anyone as beneficiary of a life insur-
ance policy procured by him, and no reimbursement of premiums
24. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956).
25. See, e.g., Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902).
26. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964).
27. This rule is generally applicable in relation to acquisitions by the wife.
See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964).
28. La. Acts 1914, No. 189, § 1: "[T]he proceeds or avails of all life, including
fraternal and co-operative, health and accident insurance shall be exempt from
all liability for any debt, except for a debt secured by a pledge of such policy, or
any rights under such policy that may have been assigned; or any advance pay-
ments made on or against such policy." The provision now appears in much broad-
ened form as LA. R.S. 22:647 (Supp. 1963), as amended.
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is due the community even though all premiums are paid from
community funds.29 It has been suggested that the theoretical
justification for the rule can lie only in article 240430 which pro-
hibits the husband as head and master of the community from
making excessive gifts to third persons from community funds.8 1
In answering attacks on the rule pitched upon this restriction
on donations, the courts have been unequivocal:
"[A] life insurance policy is a contract sui generis; governed
by rules peculiar to itself, the outgrowth of judicial prece-
dent and not of legislation. . . [T]he Court has repeatedly
refused to apply to such policies the provisions of the Civil
Code relative to donations inter vivos. '3 2
Thus it has been held that a policy of life insurance was not
revocable under article 1749 when made payable to the other
spouse,88 that a policy is not subject to collation under article
1228 when made payable to children of the marriage, 34 that a
policy is not reduceable as impinging upon the rights of forced
heirs,3 5 and that a policy is not subject to the prohibition of ar-
ticle 1481, which limits donations to a concubine to one-tenth of
29. See, e.g., Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930) ; VANCE, IN-
SURANCE § 105 (3d ed. 1951).
30. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870) forbids the husband to make a gift inter
vivos "of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless it be for the establish-
ment of the children of the marriage," but further provides "nevertheless he may
dispose of the movable effects by a gratuitous and particular title to the benefit
of all persons."
31. Nabors, Civil Law Influences Upon the Law of Insurance in Louisiana-
Life Insurance Problems Under the Community Property System, 6 TUL. L. REV.
515 (1932). This interpretation of article 2404 is probably erroneous, because
the article expressly allows donations by particular title of movables of the com-
munity, and prohibits universal donations and donations by universal title of com-
munity movable effects.
32. Ticker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 11 Orl. App. 55, 59 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1914), approved, Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 130, 127 So. 388 (1930).
In Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 834, 118 So. 35, 37 (1928)
the court said: "It is the settled jurisprudence of this court that life insurance
policies are neither donations inter vivos nor mortis causa, and that the provisions
of the Civil Code relative to donations and collation will not be applied to such
policies."
33. Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 24 So. 16 (1898)
Putnam v. New York Life Ins. Co., 42 La. Ann. 739, 7 So. 602 (1890) ; Pilcher
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 33 La. Ann. 322 (1881). LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1749
(1870), which provided that all donations between married persons during mar-
riage, though termed inter vivos, were revocable before the death of the donor,
was repealed by La. Acts 1942, No. 187, in order to avoid federal estate tax liabil-
ity for the donor. See LA. R.S. 9:2351-2353 (1950) ; Comment, 1 LOYOLA L. REv.
194 (1942).
34. Sherwood v. New York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
35. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930) ; Sherwood v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 166 La. 829, 118 So. 35 (1928).
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:the movable estate of the donor.36 Since the enactment of Act
292 of 194037 it has been clear that the provisions of the Civil
;Code relative to the form of donations inter vivos do not apply
to donations inter vivos of life insurance policies, or the naming
of beneficiaries therein. 38
Since the passage of the Married Women's Emancipation
Acts,39 married women have had legal capacity to perform most
legal acts for themselves. The wife seems to have full power to
bind the community for necessaries and in matters considered
ordinary transactions of the community.40 Even in extraordi-
nary transactions the courts have been liberal in finding an
agency relationship between husband, as head and master of the
community, and wife,41 or in finding a ratification by the hus-
band after learning of the wife's act.42 Although no case has
been found in point, it would seem that the wife's procurement
of an insurance policy, paying premiums with community funds,
might be a valid and binding contract upon the community. 4 3
There is more than a possibility, however, that if a non-consent-
ing husband learns of his wife's insurance contract soon after
the policy's inception, he would be allowed to rescind it. But it
seems both socially and economically desirable not to allow the
husband to rescind a policy which has been in effect for a sub-
stantial period of time, or one of which he had knowledge and
failed to act immediately to rescind it.
b. Payable to the Insured's Spouse. - As early as 187144
36. Sizeler v. Sizeler, 170 La. 128, 127 So. 388 (1930) ; Grayson v. Life Ins.
Co. of Virginia, 144 So. 643 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1932).
37. La. Acts 1940, No. 292, §§ 1, 2, now LA. R.S. 22:1521 (Supp. 1963):
"Donations inter vivos of life insurance policies, and the naming of beneficiaries
therein, whether revocably or irrevocably, are not governed by the provisions of
the Revised Civil Code of 1870 or any other laws of this state, relative to the form
of donations inter vivos.
"This Section does not effect a change in the laws of this state nor does it
indicate that the laws relative to the form which donations inter vivos must take
ever applied to donations inter vivos of life insurance policies or to the naming
of beneficiaries therein."
38. The case of Barone v. Williams, 199 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1952) indicates
the provisions of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1491 (1870), which excludes proof of dis-
positions made because of hatred, anger, suggestion or captation, are inapplicable
by reason of LA. R.S. 22:1521 (1950), and that proof that a change of bene-
ficiaries had been procured by undue influence was admissible.
39. LA. R.S. 9:101-105 (1950).
40. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 201 (1964).
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Cf. Bain v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 188 La. 290, 176 So. 129 (1937) ; Suc-
"cession of Emonot, 109 La. 359, 33 So. 368 (1902) ; Payton v. Jones, 38 So. 2d
1631 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1949).
44. Succession of Kugler, 23 La. Ann. 455 (1871).
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the rule was announced that the proceeds of a policy taken out
during marriage by the husband and made payable to the wife
became her separate property. The rule has been consistently
followed 45 and extended by rejection of the community's demand
for reimbursement of premiums paid.46 The early courts of-
fered no justification from the rules governing community prop-
erty. One authority47 has urged that the justification lies in
the ability of the spouses to make donations to each other under
the provisions of article 1746. However, the cases do not bear
out this reasoning and even reject the application of the rules
governing donations to life insurance.4" Indeed, cases indicate
that a life insurance policy is sui generis and governed by its
own terms and judicial rules peculiarly applicable to it.
If, on the other hand, it is the wife who procures a policy
payable to the husband, a theoretical objection is found to the
application of the rule allowing the beneficiary to take the pro-
ceeds as separate property without the obligation of reimburs-
ing the community the amount of the premiums paid to main-
tain the policy in force. The objection is that the husband, as
head and master of the community, by mere consent to the act
of the wife, would be able to convert community funds, in the
form of premiums paid on the policy, into separate property, to
be paid to him upon the death of the cestui que vie. Since the
rationale of article 2408 seems to prohibit such an advantage to
the husband, it may be that the community would be entitled to
be reimbursed for the amount of the premiums paid.49 However,
it seems likely, in view of the modern trend of the court to view
the wife as a nearly equal partner in the community, that no
such exception to the settled rule will be pronounced.
c. Payable to the Insured's Estate. - The proceeds of a pol-
icy which is the separate property of the insured, made payable
to his own estate, fall into the separate estate of the insured.50
45. See Douglas v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922),
and cases cited therein, id. at 533, 90 So. at 839.
46. See Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
47. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 79 (1943).
48. See note 32 supra.
49. Cf. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939) ; Succession of
LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917) ; Succession of Verneuille, 120 La. 605,
45 So. 520 (1908) ; In re Moseman, 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886) ; Succession of Bofen-
schen, 29 La. Ann. 711 (1877) ; Succession of McLellan, 144 So. 2d 291 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1962). See notes 18 and 19 supra, and accompanying text.
50. Succession of Lewis, 192 La. 734, 189 So. 118 (1939) ; Succession of




Although it does not necessarily follow, for the reason that the
community is dissolved by the same event which brings the pro-
ceeds into being, the proceeds under a policy characterized as
community property, payable to the insured's own estate, are
also community property. This rule results from the theory of
reimbursement, under which a spouse cannot appropriate com-
munity funds to his separate estate.5 1
B. When One Spouse Insures the Life of the Other in His
Own Favor
The restrictions upon the ability of a spouse to enrich his
own separate estate at the expense of the community estate
would give community property status to the proceeds of a pol-
icy taken out by one spouse upon the life of the other, payable to
himself.52 However, it is arguable that it is socially and econom-
ically desirable to allow the wife to protect herself by insuring
the life of her husband in her own favor, the proceeds payable
under the policy to be paid to the wife as her separate prop-
erty.5  Ratification of such transaction by the husband could
be .inferred from his conduct, such as submission to a physical
examination, participation in premium payments, or even a sim-
ple failure to make timely objection to the wife's act, so that the
proceeds of the community policy inure to the wife, when paid,
as her separate property.
C. When the Beneficiary Intentionally Kills the Insured
In Louisiana forfeiture of goods to the state as a penalty for
the commission of a felony has never been the rule. Neither, it
51. See Succession of Buddig, 108 La. 406, 408, 32 So. 361, 362 (1902)
("[The husband] has no right to transact so as to build up a separate estate to
the disadvantage of the community. As to him, primarily all the property belongs
to the community."); Succession of Farrell, 200 La. 29, 7 So. 2d 605 (1942)
Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126 (1937)
Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
-52. See note 51 supra, and accompanying text.
53. Cf. Bain v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 188 La. 290, 176 So. 129 (1937). The
wife took out two policies of accident insurance during the marriage; she suf-
fered an accidental injury and brought suit in her own name. The insurer de-
fended upon the grounds that the proceeds of an insurance policy procured dur-
ing marriage were community funds, and that the husband, as head and master
of the community, was the only person who could institute the action. The court
held the wife's action was well founded. The decision has been weakened some-
what, however, by the fact that, in reaching its decision, the court relied upon
the life insurance rule, particularly the case of Douglass v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922), finding that the proceeds were the separate
property of the wife. It seems that this latter point has been impliedly overruled
by Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin, 211 La. 1089, 31 So. 2d 220 (1947).
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appears, is forfeiture to the other spouse of a spouse's interest
in the community property a penalty for felony. However, it
has been established by the jurisprudence that the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy who feloniously takes the life of the
insured is not entitled to the proceeds of the policy.5 4 In Succes-
sion of Butler,5 5 a wife found guilty of manslaughter of the
insured husband was held to have forfeited her rights as bene-
ficiary under the policy acquired during the marriage with com-
munity funds. Strength was added to this conclusion by the
terms of the policy, which provided that if a beneficiary takes
the life of the insured, the policy will be payable to the insured's
estate. The court went further, however, and found that the
proceeds were acquired by the insured's separate estate. The
rationale of the court was that the husband, who had reserved
the right to change beneficiaries, could nullify any right the
wife might have to the proceeds by a mere change of benefi-
ciaries: "a fortiori, the same result should follow where the pol-
icy provides for the change of beneficiary by her felonious kill-
ing of her husband." 56
The finding that the proceeds fall into the separate estate of
the murdered husband simply does not follow from the court's
major premise in the Butler case, that the husband, who had re-
served the right to change beneficiaries, can nullify any right
the wife might have to the proceeds by a mere change of bene-
ficiaries. The well-settled rule in Louisiana is that the husband
who takes out a policy during the marriage, and under which
the proceeds are ultimately paid to his estate, will not take those
proceeds into his separate estate, but rather the proceeds are
counted as community property.57 Thus, it is submitted that the
proper result in Butler would have been a holding that the pro-
ceeds fell into the community, one-half of which the wife was
entitled to as owner. It is seriously doubted, for example, that
54. See American Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Shaddinger, 205 La. 11, 16 So. 2d
889 (1944), and cases cited therein.
55. 147 So. 2d 684 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
56. Id. at 686. The court continued: "In such event, the wife, having for-
feited her right, the husband's separate estate becomes the beneficiary, because
his death dissolved the community. Any property acquired by his estate after
death belongs to his separate estate, not the community." (Emphasis added.)While
logically supportable, the notion that the community cannot receive proceeds of a
community policy after its dissolution was rejected in Succession of Buddig, 108
La. 406, 32 So. 361 (1902) ; accord, Succession of Farrell, 200 La. 29, 7 So. 2d
605 (1942) ; Berry v. Franklin State Bank & Trust Co., 186 La. 623, 173 So. 126
(1937) ; Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223 (1917).
57. See cases cited in note 51 supra.
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the wife who has killed her husband with the intent to come into
full ownership of valuable community property, such as stocks
or bonds, would be held to have forfeited her share in that same
community property.
It can be argued, however, upon the analogy of life insurance
to a donation mortis causa, that under article 1691, which pro-
vides for the automatic revocation of dispositions mortis causa
when the legatee has unlawfully taken the life of the testator,
and under article 966, which provides that such a person is also
unworthy of inheriting from the deceased, the beneficiary who
intentionally kills the insured, should not be entitled to receive
any benefit whatsoever from the insurance contract. It is likely
that the court in Butler was motivated by this notion of good
social order.
But a dilemma in the Butler situation remains: should the
code articles on donations be applied (though contracts of life
insurance have been judicially characterized as sui generis), or
a general principle, deducible from the Civil Code articles re-
garding community property?
D. When the Community Is Dissolved by Divorce
Policies of separate character will not be affected by divorce,
thus this discussion presupposes a policy which is a community
asset. Also, should the proceeds be payable to a spouse or a
third person, the insured not having reserved the right to change
beneficiaries, or should the proceeds be due under the policy,
divorce would not affect the character of the proceeds. The fol-
lowing discussion is concerned only with the peculiar situation
of a community policy, which is not indefeasibly payable, or
whose proceeds are not due, to the other spouse or some third
person.
Settlement of the community policy is likely to be made at
the same time the remainder of the community is divided.
Therefore, some method of voluntary division of the community
life insurance policy between the spouses is desirable. Cases
holding the community entitled to reimbursement for premiums
paid to maintain a separate policy may be used to form the
basis for division upon divorce. Thus, if one spouse mainfests
a desire to take the policy as his own, he could do so upon re-
imbursing the community for premiums paid, as if the policy
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had always been his separate property. This sum would be
easily determinable, and could be awarded by the court dis-
solving the community, and approving the community settle-
ment.
A better solution seems to be settlement between the spouses
for the cash surrender value of the policy. 58 This method of
voluntary settlement has the advantages of ease of valuation,
while offering the insured a choice whether to cash the policy
in or to pay one-half of that amount to the former spouse and
retain the policy as his separate property, thereby keeping the
policy in effect.5 9
An alternative method of valuation has been suggested as
being more equitable.60 Rather than the cash surrender value,
the "actual value" of the policy is determined and apportioned
between the spouses. This method reflects the insurability of
the insured, by taking into account both his life expectancy and
his health, at the time of the dissolution of the community. For
example, a relatively new policy may have a very modest cash
surrender value, or none at all. The premiums which have been
paid may constitute a small sum. Either situation may occur
58. Although the case was reversed on other grounds, not pertinent here, the
disposition made by the trial court in Daigre v. Daigre, 230 La. 472, 89 'So. 2d
41 (1956), is illustrative. There the husband had taken out a policy before mar-
riage, and two policies during the marriage. All premiums during the marriage
had been paid from community funds. Upon settlement of the community, the
wife was given one-half of the premiums paid during the marriage on the policy
taken out by the husband before the marriage, and one-half of the cash surrender
value of the two policies acquired during the marriage. The Supreme Court had
no criticism of this disposition by the trial judge.
59. This method of division between the spouses of a community life insurance
policy upon divorce has been the subject of much litigation and judicial consid-
eration and has received judicial approval in Texas because of its unique doc-
trine that insurable interest in life insurance must exist both at the inception of
the policy and at its maturity. Since a spouse no longer has any insurable interest
in his divorced spouse's life, he could not collect the proceeds in Texas after di-
vorce. Thus, it is of the greatest necessity that a policy be divided in some manner
at liquidation of the community, or it will be void. See Equitable Life Assur.
Soc. v. Hazelwood, 75 Tex. 338, 12 S.W. 621 (1889).
That the cash surrender value method of partition should find favor in Louisi-
ana may be noted from its consistency with the notion expressed in Civil Code
article 2408: that when the separate property of one of the spouses has been
increased in value during the marriage, the increase being due to common labor,
expenses, or industry, the other spouse is entitled to the reward of one-half of
th ameliorations.
60. See Huie, Community Property Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 17
TEXAS L. REV. 121, 143 (1939). The author's principal criticism of reimburse-
ment in the amount of one-half of the premiums paid is that the method fails to
take into account the fact that part of the consideration for which the premiums
had been paid had been received - namely, the protection which the insurance
policy afforded during the marriage.
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after the insured has suffered a stroke, or contracted a disease,
which lessens his life expectancy, and thus increases the "actual
value" of the insurance in force far in excess of its cash sur-
render value or the total amount of premiums paid.
If the parties fail to agree on the method of partition and
valuation there seems to be no valid reason to deny the court the
authority to decree a partition at the demand of either party
and to determine the value of the policy in an equitable manner.
E. Onerous Transactions Wit& a Life Insurance Policy
Assignments of life policies before maturity may be absolute
or conditional. In the absolute assignment the assignor trans-
fers his whole interest, thus entitling the assignee to the whole
of the proceeds when payable. In the conditional assignment the
intention is to secure a debt and the extent of the assignee-cred-
itor's interest is measured by the debt.61 The surplus remaining
over the amount of the debt will be paid to the contingent bene-
ficiary, whether the insured's estate, his spouse or a third per-
son.
62
The husband has specific power to dispose of community.
property under onerous title without the permission of the
wife.63 Consequently, he may validly assign a community life in-
surance policy for a consideration. No matter what the type of
the assignment, the consideration received, whether movable or
immovable, will be community property. 4 The validity of such
an act by the wife has been discussed earlier65 and it seems cer-
tain that the consideration received will fall into the community.
A more serious problem is created when the policy is the
separate property of one of the spouses. Although no case has
so held, it seems that the consideration received for the assign-
ment of a separate policy assumes that character as if acquired
by purchase or exchange.6 6 This rule must be qualified to the
61. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 129 (3d ed. 1951).
62. ibid.
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
64. See Hogan v. Hall, 118 F.2d 247 (5th Cir. 1941) ; Douglass v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., 150 La. 519, 90 So. 834 (1922) ; Lambert v. Penn Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 50 La. Ann. 1027, 24 So. 16 (1898). Although in each of these cases
the assignee was in fact a creditor of the insured, in none does it appear that the
assignment was intended to be merely collateral for the debt, but rather that the
insured-assignor intended to part with the whole of his interest. See VANCE, IN-
SURANCE § 129 (3d ed. 1951).
65. See notes 39-42 supra, and accompanying text.
66. The acquisition would be presumed community, but either spouse could
prove its separate character. See Comment, 25 LA. L. REV. 95 (1964).
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extent that if the assignor is the husband, and if he receives an
immovable as consideration, the title must reflect the fact the
husband used separate property to make the acquisition and he
intended it to inure to his separate account.6 7
In the case of the conditional assignment, to secure a debt,
the surplus of the proceeds paid over the amount of the debt
will be paid to the contingent beneficiary. There seems to be
no valid reason for denying the application of the rule which.
characterizes the proceeds as community or separate property
according to whom they are ultimately paid under the terms of
the. policy.6 8
F. National Service Life Insurance
In 1940 Congress enacted the National Service Life Insur-
ance Act 69 which has provided low cost life insurance to certain
members of the active armed services of the United States for
the protection of their dependents in a manner similar to the
War Risk Insurance ° of World War I. A National Service Life
Insurance policy is a contract with the government, and its va-
lidity and interpretation present questions of federal law.71 Al-
though a policy may be procured during the marriage and char-
acterized as community property under state law, the commu-
nity property rules of the state cannot have effect where there
is a contrary congressional intent, even if the serviceman intends
to deprive his wife of a right guaranteed by state law. 72 It seems
clear, however, that a state court called upon to determine ques-
.67. Ibid.
68. See text accompanying notes 28-51 supra. Frequently, upon conditional
assignment, the beneficiary is changed to the name of the creditor, "as his inter-
est may appear," and payable secondarily to the insured's estate, his spouse, or a
third person, as contingent beneficiary. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 123 (3d ed.
1951) .
69. 38 U.S.C. §§ 701-724 (Supp. 1959). The National Service Life Insurance
Act of 1940 was repealed and re-enacted as part of Title 38, United States Code,
by the Act of September 2, 1958, 72 Stat. 1105, effective January 1, 1959. It is'
a system of low cost, dividend sharing, life insurance enacted for the protection
of dependents of servicemen in active military service during World War II and
the Korean War. Its counterpart of World War I was War Risk Insurance.
National Service Life Insurance is also distinguishable from United States Gov-
ernment Life Insurance and the gratuitous Korean War indemnity benefits. This
paper is concerned only with National Service Life Insurance because of the pre-
dominant role it plays in government insurance. See generally KIMBROUGH &
GLEN, AMERICAN LAW OF VETERANS § 418 (2d ed. 1954).
70. 38 U.S.C. §§ 740-760 (Supp. 1959).
71. Pack v. United States, 176 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949).
72. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950). There, the serviceman had
named his mother as beneficiary, the policy having been purchased with commu-
nity funds. In California, the wife has a vested interest in one-half of the pro-.
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tions of succession rights and community settlements upon di-
vorce should apply usual community property principles in all
areas where the federal statute has not expressed a contrary
principle,7 3 and in most cases National Service Life Insurance
will be treated just as commercial life insurance.
Under the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
the National Service Life Insurance Act the proceeds of such a
policy are payable to the beneficiary as his separate property.74
This result, of course, is in accord with the Louisiana jurispru-
dence.75 The unresolved question is the character of the pro-
ceeds where payable to the insured's own estate. Under the pro-
visions of 38 U.S.C. section 717(d), proceeds are payable to the
insured's estate when: (1) the insured has so designated; (2)
no beneficiary is designated, or the designated beneficiary does
not survive the insured; or (3) a designated beneficiary en-
titled only to installment settlement survives the insured, but
dies before receiving all sums due and payable. Although there
are no Louisiana cases dealing with a National Service Life In-
surance policy, a case considering this problem under the sim-
ilar War Risk policy found no conflicting federal statute and
applied the rule applicable to ordinary commercial insurance.7 6
G. Annuity Contracts
The annuity contract contemplated by Louisiana Civil Code
articles 2793-2800 is an extremely limited type of annuity, by
which one person engages to pay a periodic annuity to another
ceeds of such a community policy, even though the insured has reserved the right
to change beneficiaries. The Court held that Congress had made clear its intent
to allow a serviceman to select the beneficiary of his own government life insur-
ance policy regardless of state law, even when it was likely that the husband in-
tended to deprive his wife of a right to share in his life insurance proceeds, a
right guaranteed by state law. See Comment, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 374 (1959) ; cf.
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962). But see Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 84 Sup. Ct.
742 (1964).
73. See Estate of Allie, 50 Cal. 2d 794, 329 P.2d 903 (1958).
74. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
75. See cases cited in notes 29 and 45 supra.
76. Succession of Jones, 185 La. 377, 169 So. 440 (1936). During his mar-
riage, the husband took out a War Risk insurance policy making his mother the
beneficiary. He directed that the proceeds were to be paid in installments during
the life of the beneficiary, any balance to be paid to the estate of the insured. After
the death of the insured and the beneficiary, a dispute arose between the wife and
heirs of the husband as to the character of the proceeds paid to the deceased's
estate. The court held, in accordance with prior jurisprudence, that the proceeds
of a community property policy, paid to the estate of the deceased, fell into the
community. Thus, the wife was entitled to one-half as survivor in community.
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in exchange for a sum of money which the lender agrees not to
claim.77 It may be assimilated to a loan on interest, but is dis-
tinguishable in that the sum is not due to be repaid, so long as
the annuity is paid.78 The courts have determined that the code
definitions are not exclusive79 and there is nothing which pro-
hibits an annuity contract different from that contemplated by
the Code.80
The common form of annuity contract, as developed in the
common law,"' is entirely different from a life insurance policy.
A lump sum is paid to the insurance company immediately and
the annuitant receives the annuity payments so long as he lives.
It is therefore opposite from life insurance, where the insured
pays a periodic payment and a beneficiary receives a lump sum.
It has become popular for annuity contracts to provide for total
repayment, or a substantial portion thereof, of the sum paid for
the annuity in the event of the annuitant's premature death.
Thus, the annuitant often names a beneficiary to whom this pay-
ment will be made. This contract is the refund annuity, and,
although payable at death, it does not constitute insurance.8 2
The annuity may be issued on a group basis, thus allowing em-
ployers to contribute to a satisfactory retirement fund for em-
ployees.18
It is clear that an annuity contract is an incorporeal, mov-
able thing, susceptible of being characterized as either commu-
nity or separate property.8 4 The rule developed in the life in-
surance cases that the contract's character depends upon
whether it was acquired before or during the marriage is ap-
plicable to the annuity contract itself and to any payments made
to the annuitant himself.8 5 The rationale of this determination
is more likely the general rule expressed by article 2402 than
the analogy to life insurance.
77. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2793 (1870) : "The contract of annuity is that by
which one party delivers to another a sum of money, and agrees not to reclaim
it so long as the receiver pays the rent agreed upon."
78. See 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) nos. 2089-2095, 2114-2139 (1959).
79. Succession of Cotton, 172 La. 819, 135 So. 368 (1931).
80. Succession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
81. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 200 (3d ed. 1951).
82. See, e.g., Succession of Pedrick, 207 La. 640, 21 So. 2d 859 (1945) ; Suc-
cession of Rabouin, 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
83. See Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So. 2d 169 (1958). See
generally VANCE, INSURANCE § 200 (3d ed. 1951).




The. analogy to life insurance is clearly not applicable in the
situation presented by Succession of Rabouin.8 6 There the de-
ceased had a number of annuity contracts providing that any
unpaid balance at the time of his death was payable to a favored
child. When that sum was added to the other dispositions to the
child, the total exceeded the disposable portion, and the other
forced heirs objected. The beneficiary urged that the proceeds
were the same as life insurance, and thus her property and not
.part of the deceased's estate. The court rejected this contention,
drawing a distinction between life insurance proceeds and pro-
ceeds payable under an annuity contract. It seems clear from
the Rabouin rationale that, if the beneficiary had been the sur-
viving spouse, that spouse would not have been able to claim the
proceeds as her separate property.
Because of the peculiar character of the annuity contract as
a purchase of a right to the periodic payment of income for life,
it is not unlikely that a spouse will desire to bind only his separ-
,ate estate to the contract. There is no case in point, but it would
seem, although one writer has urged the analogy to immov-
ables, 7 that the correct interpretation is by assimilation to
movables, wherein either spouse would be entitled to prove the
separate character of the contract by showing it was entered
into with separate funds, and with the intention that the con-
tract would be separate property. 88
II. PROPERTY INSURANCE
Since the basis of the contract of insurance on property is
indemnity or restoration of a loss to property,8 9 the cases have
announced the general rule that the proceeds of a property in-
surance contract will take on the character of the property to be
86. 201 La. 227, 9 So. 2d 529 (1942).
87. Comment, 17 LA. L. REV. 810 (1957).
88. See discussion at note 26 supra.
89. See VANCE, INSURANCE § 14 (3d ed. 1951). The contract of property in-
surance is a personal contract between the insured and the insurer. Id. § 13. Al-
though under the provisions of LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 460, 470, 475, 870 (1870),
the contract can be classified as property, in the sense of an incorporeal, movable
thing, it is aleatory in character, and of no value to anyone who does not have
insurable interest in the subject-matter. In the event of dissolution of the com-
munity by divorce, the policy of property insurance could not be divided between
the spouses in the same manner as a life insurance policy. It is therefore unneces-
sary to characterize the contract of property insurance itself as either community
or separate property and this discussion will be limited to characterization of
the proceeds of such a policy upon the occurrence of the event insured against.
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restored or indemnified.90 Thus, when one spouse procures fire
insurance on a building belonging to the community and pays
the premiums from community funds, he does so for the benefit
of the community estate, and proceeds payable under the policy
will inure to the community. When separate property is insured
through the use of separate funds, the proceeds payable in event
of fire, or other event insured against,91 are separate property.
A different problem arises when either community funds are
used to insure separate property or separate funds are used to
insure community property. There are two possible solutions:
first, in conformity with the general rule, the proceeds take on
the character of the property to be indemnified or restored, and
the other estate, which has contributed to the payment of the
premiums is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of its con-
tribution; second, the proceeds may be considered as separate
or community in the proportion that the funds used to pay pre-
miums bear to the total amount recovered. This solution would
result in a mixed title to the property restored,92 and is objec-
tionable for that very reason. The former solution has found
favor in Louisiana, and does not necessitate the formulation of
an exception to the general rule.
An exception to the ancillary right of reimbursement in cer-
tain cases may be found, however, if a separate piece of prop-
erty is used exclusively for family purposes. For example, when
one spouse owns a house in his separate right, but allows the
family to live there, it seems that the community ought to bear
the burden of the property insurance premiums and would have
no claim for reimbursement.9 3 Another situation which seems to
90. Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956). See Hall v. Tous-
saint, 52 La. Ann. 1763, 28 So. 304 (1900) ; McKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 468
(2d ed. 1925).
91. In addition to the peril of fire, the owner of immovables or movables will
desire to protect his property against other perils such as lightning, hail, earth-
quake, explosion, riot, rain, smoke, and a variety of others. Insurance companies
have undertaken to provide coverages for most of the known risks to property,
and have done so by providing a vast number of policies, forms and clauses. See
generally MEHR & CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 275-305, 418-33 (3d ed.
1961).
92. See Love v. Robertson, 7 Tex. 6 (1851) ; MCKAY, COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 407 (2d ed. 1925). For a discussion of the Texas view as compared to the Lou-
isiana view, see Huie, Separate Ownership of Specific Property Versus Restitu-
tion from Community Property in Louisiana, 26 TUL. L. REV. 427 (1952).
93. See Thigpen v. Thigpen, 231 La. 206, 91 So. 2d 12 (1956) ; see Godchaux
& Mayer v. Richardson, 123 So. 178 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929) (insurance on
wife's separate automobile) ; cf. Sharp v. Zeller, 110 La. 61, 34 So. 129 (1902)
Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884). : •
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merit an exception to the general rule is suggested by the third
paragraph of article 2334 :94 a wife who is living separate and
apart from her husband and is engaged in a separate business.
Since the Civil Code provides that the earnings thus derived are
the separate property of the wife, it seems only fair that she
should bear the burden of the property insurance premiums on
a building belonging to the community in which she conducts
her business.
As the character of the property insured against damage or
destruction by fire is of little concern to the insurer, the legisla-
ture simplified the issues between the insured and the insurer
by removing the necessity of testing ownership of the property
as, between husband and wife. Act 158 of 193695 provides that
it is not a defense to an insurer that the policy was issued in the
name of one of the spouses when the property was that of the
community or that of the unnamed spouse. This statute seems
not to apply when the community has been dissolved and the
property given in full ownership to' one spouse, as the other
could not then meet the requirement of insurable interest in the
property.
III. HEALTH INSURANCE
Health insurance is designed to pay the cost of hospital and
medical expenses, and to indemnify the insured for loss of in-
come arising out of accidental injury or sickness.9 8 As the cov-
erage may include protection against expenses incurred from
accident or sickness, or the disability which may result from
either, it is not completely analogous to either life or indemnity
insurance. It is true that disability and accident benefits are
often included as part of a life insurance contract; and certain
insurance doctrines such as representation, concealment, war-
ranty, waiver and estoppel are applicable to both life and health
insurance contracts.9 7 However, an important distinction be-
94. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), in part: 'The property of married per-
sons is divided into separate and common property ....
"The earnings of the wife when living separate and apart from her husband
although not separated by judgment of court, her earnings when carrying on a
business, trade, occupation or industry separate from her husband, actions for
damages resulting from offenses and quasi offenses and the property purchased
with all funds thus derived, are her separate property."
95. La. Acts 1936, No. 158, has been re-enacted without substantial change
and now appears as LA. R.S. 22:693 (1950). See Comment, 12 TUL. L. REV.
131 (1937).
96. See MER & CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 472-504 (3d ed. 1961).
97. See, e.g., VANCE, INSURANCE § 179 (3d ed. 1951).
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tween life and health insurance, and one which closely allies the
latter to indemnity insurance, is that health insurance is a form
of agreed compensation for an actual loss. The proceeds are pay-
able during the life of the cestui que vie and are designed to be
used to pay his medical expenses and replace lost income. The
fact that the insured may vary the amount of the benefits which
would be due upon the occurrence of the event insured against
does not spoil the analogy to restoration of lost wages during
the existence of the disability.
In Easterling v. Succession of Lamkin98 a life insurance pol-
icy which incorporated disability benefits was taken out by the
husband before marriage. After marriage, the insured changed
beneficiaries under the life benefit, naming his wife. The in-
sured became afflicted with serious ailments, which caused total
disability. Five years later he died. The insurer failed to pay
the disability benefits due under the policy until after the in-
sured's death, and a dispute arose over this sum which required
the court to determine the character of the funds as either sep-
arate or community. The heirs of the deceased urged applica-
tion of the life insurance rule which would place the disability
proceeds in his separate estate. The court recognized the ap-
plicability of the life insurance rule to the proceeds of the death
benefit, for it found that they became the separate property of
the wife as named beneficiary, but refused to apply that rule to
the disability proceeds, finding that they fell into the commu-
nity. The court reasoned that the disability payment was "in
lieu of or as compensation for the loss of earning capacity of
the insured."9 9 Thus, the policy remained the separate property
of the husband, but when the proceeds were paid under the dis-
ability provision, as indemnification for lost wages, the proceeds
took on the character of the lost wages, which were clearly com-
munity.100
98. 211 La. 1089, 31 So. 2d 220 (1947).
99. id. at 1099, 31 So. 2d at 224.
100. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2402 (1870). The opinion in Basterling failed
to discuss the earlier case of Bain v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 188 La. 290, 176 So.
129 (1937), in which a wife, during the existence of the community, took out a
policy of accident insurance in her own name, and was found to be entitled to the
proceeds as her separate property, the court relying on the life insurance rule
for its holding. It seems that the Bain case has been impliedly overruled at least
to the extent that the proceeds will no longer become the separate property of
the wife, but will fall into the community. It still seems possible for the wife,
who is the named beneficiary, to bring the action for the proceeds; but if she is
to benefit solely as a dependent member of the community, she must defer to the
action of the husband, as the head and master of the community. See Sanders v.




A great cleavage runs between contracts designed to indem-
nify against a loss of property and contracts which are not of
indemnification, such as life insurance. Health insurance con-
tracts, for purposes of characterization of their proceeds as com-
munity or separate, fall on the side of the indemnity policies,
and annuity contracts, on the side of those not designed to in-
demnify.
In most situations concerning non-indemnity policies the
characterization as separate or community property must be
made of both the policy and the proceeds. Notwithstanding the
characterization of the policy itself, if the proceeds are ultimate-
ly paid to the insured's spouse or to some third person, they be-
come the payee's separate property. When a policy is taken out
before marriage and, upon the death of the insured, the proceeds
are payable to the estate of the insured, the estate takes the pro-
ceeds as separate property. If payments to sustain it are made
during marriage from community funds, the community is en-
titled to be reimbursed for premiums paid, as the policy at all
times belonged to the separate estate of the insured. If, on the
other hand, the policy is acquired during the marriage, the pol-
icy itself would be community property, and the proceeds paid
to the insured's estate would inure to the community. A method
of valuation of policies which are community property is neces-
sary in the event of divorce and community settlement; parti-
tion at the cash surrender value seems to be the prevailing
method.
The proceeds of a property insurance contract will assume
the same character as the property indemnified. If community
funds are used to acquire indemnification insurance on separate
property, the community is entitled to be reimbursed for the
amount of the premiums paid with the possible exception of
separate property being used exclusively for community pur-
poses.
Health insurance proceeds are characterized in the same
manner as indemnification insurance, by ascertaining the char-
acter of the property lost or the debts incurred, notwithstand-
ing the fact that accident and disability benefits are usually
found in life insurance contracts.
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Confusion has frequently resulted from attempted applica-
tion of Civil Code provisions in some situations and from absten-
tion, express or implied, in others. Particularly in the area of
donations, the courts have taken the position that the contract
is sui generis, and thus the court is free to search for the best
solution. It is submitted that all contracts of insurance should
be so treated, and that the principles of community property law
should have little or no application outside the preliminary char-
acterizations which do not conflict with settled principles of in-
surance law.
Richard B. Wilkins, Jr.
CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
"The husband is the head and master of the partnership or
community of gains."' This traditional language has been used
in each Louisiana Civil Code to give the husband control and
management of the community.2 However, the extent of the
husband's power over the community has changed greatly since
1808. More and more restrictions on the husband's power to
deal freely with community property have been added to pro-
tect the interests of the wife. This Comment examines the scope
of the husband's authority over the community under present
law and the remedies by which the wife may protect her interest.
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
There were two aspects of the husband's powers in the
system of control and management established by the 1808 Code.
First, he dealt with community property as owner ;8 second, the
wife could not interfere with the husband's management as she
lacked capacity to perform most juridical acts without the hus-
band's authorization. 4 Unauthorized acts of the wife were rela-
tive nullities which the husband could set asideY The articles
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
2. Ibid.; La. Civil Code art. 2373 (1825) ; La. Civil Code p. 336, art. 66
(1808).
3. See La. Civil Code p. 336, art. 66 (1808) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404
(1870).
4. See La. Civil Code p. 28, art. 22 (1808), dealing with the wife's incapacity
to contract, now appearing as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 122 (1870) ; La. Civil Code
p. 28, art. 21 (1808), dealing with the wife's inability to appear in court, now
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 121 (1870).
5. See La. Civil Code p. 28, art. 28 (1808) ; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 134 (1870).
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